Determinants of Firm Leverage: Further Evidence from China by Prime, Penelope B. & Qi, Li
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
International Business Faculty Publications Institute of International Business
2013
Determinants of Firm Leverage: Further Evidence
from China
Penelope B. Prime
Georgia State University, pprime@gsu.edu
Li Qi
Agnes Scott College, lqi@agnesscott.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/intlbus_facpub
Part of the International Business Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute of International Business at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Business Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For
more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Prime, Penelope B. and Qi, Li, "Determinants of Firm Leverage: Further Evidence from China" (2013). International Business Faculty
Publications. 33.
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/intlbus_facpub/33
1 
 
 Determinants of Firm Leverage: Further Evidence from China 
 
Introduction1 
 China’s economic reforms have substantially changed the industrial organization and 
management of firms.  Under central planning, state-owned enterprises dominated economic 
activity with urban and rural collectives on the fringe.  Today, the evolution of ownership forms 
and firms’ relationships to the market and government has created a range of firm types.  This 
process of privatization and modernization of firms has been particular to China.  It was not until 
the mid-1990s that the need to privatize was accepted and only in the 2000s that the government 
officially recognized private property by writing the right of private ownership into the 
constitution.    
 In the mid-1990s, China’s central leaders also initiated bank reforms in conjunction with 
public finance reform.2   Financial sector development lagged other aspects of market reforms 
with distortions in the price of capital and other constraints (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005; Aziz 
2008).  Reforms of state owned enterprises also hit a critical juncture at this time, as reflected in 
the 1994 Company Law.  By 2001 over 80 percent of state enterprises had been through some 
form of reform and over 50 million state employees had lost their jobs (Li and Putterman 2008, 
p.356).   
 Control over investment decisions by the government is a key characteristic of a planned 
economy.  Decentralizing investment to firms via freedom to invest retained profits, take out 
                                                          
1 We would like to thank the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences for their feedback on this paper during a 
seminar hosted at the Academy in November, 2011. 
2 For a full description of these reforms and economic transition in China generally see Naughton (2007).  
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loans, utilize equity markets and seek venture capital funding is a critical step in a market 
transition.  Changes in the rules for corporate governance along with market competition 
continued to force companies to transform.  The changes at some companies were faster than 
their classification, so that some state companies were probably behaving like private firms 
before they were recognized as such (Dollar and Wei 2007, p.3).   A study by Bai et al. (2009) 
found that just having issued some percentage of shares to private investors gave sufficient 
incentives to increase profits and exhibit other market driven outcomes, and Matthews et al. 
(2009) found that joint-stock banks performed better than state-owned banks.   Kato and Long 
(2006) found that privately-controlled listed firms exhibited a closer match between CEO 
turnover and firm performance than state-controlled listed firms, and that independent boards 
were positively related to CEO turnover and performance.   
 Most companies, however, were reforming despite not being listed on one of the two 
exchanges.  Studies reviewed by Li and Putterman (2008) found improved performance as 
measured by profitability and productivity, although there was evidence of continued influence 
of the state on how these companies operated, mostly in a way that enhanced profitability.  
Examining investment efficiency across firm types, however, Dollar and Wei (2007) find that 
state firms continue to have lower returns to capital than private firms. Even within the banking 
reforms passed in 1994 there was no procedure outlined for private firms to apply for funding 
without government sponsorship of some type.   Only in 1997 did the regulations change to 
allow banks to loan to private firms (Firth et al. 2009, p.1146).   In cross-country comparisons, 
China’s ranking in terms of access to financing is quite low (Salvatore 2010).   
 The purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of Chinese domestic firms’ 
leverage positions using a sample survey of manufacturing firms that are overwhelmingly 
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unlisted from the mid-2000s—a decade after the loan options opened up.  Studies of leverage 
determinants in China to date have focused on the small number of listed firms or the behavior of 
foreign firms in China (Chen 2004, Tong and Green 2005, Huang and Song 2006, Ni and Yu 
2008, Li et al. 2009, Liu et al. 2011).  To our knowledge, the only study of leverage that focused 
on non-listed domestic firms (Keister 2004) investigated firm-borrowing of former state owned 
enterprises using a much older data set for the period of 1980-1989.  Our sample contains not 
only Chinese domestic firms that are largely unlisted, but also provides new evidence with more 
recent data.    In addition, our study adds insights into the leverage determinants of firms of 
different ownership types, adding to the results of earlier studies on a small number of listed 
firms.      
 Foreshadowing our results, we find that the pecking order theory explains leverage fairly 
well in the case of China’s private firms’ financing, but leverage is also heavily influenced by 
ownership forms and the market environments in which firms operate.  This diverging behavior 
between private firms and others suggests that market and financial reforms are incomplete in 
China.   Leverage determinants of private firms, especially small and medium-sized (SMEs) 
private firms are explained the best by the theory.  In contrast, state-owned firms’ leverage is not 
explained well at all, and the results for mixed ownership firms were similar to the state firms.    
 In the next section of the paper we discuss the theoretical capital structure research to 
justify the application of the pecking order theory and to develop a series of testable hypotheses 
appropriate for China’s phase of economic transition.  The third section presents our data and 
estimation procedure.  The fourth section discusses the results, and the final section summarizes 
our findings and their implications.   
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Research on Firm Capital Structure 
 A number of major theories of capital structure are debated within the literature, 
including pecking order theory, trade-off theory, market timing theory and signaling theory.  For 
privately-held firms only the first two are relevant, since market timing and signaling theory deal 
with incentives to issue shares.  The pecking order theory postulates that firms prefer to use 
retained profits for funding over banks loans because of asymmetric information or transaction 
costs, or both (Myers 1984; Titman and Wessels 1988, p.6; Sogorb-Mira and Lopez-Gracia 
2003, pp.7-8).  The third option, issuing equity to outside sources, is the last choice whether 
because of preferences to maintain control or constraints on firms in the ability to issue shares.  
The trade-off theory focuses on a firm’s choice between gaining tax benefits from interest 
payments on debt and the costs of possible financial distress if the firm is indebted to a bank.  
 These fundamental capital structure theories have been widely tested with empirical data 
from the U.S. and other developed countries.  For example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) extended 
the empirical evidence largely based on firms in the United States to the G-7 countries, where 
they use four key variables to investigate the capital structure determinants: the tangibility of 
assets, market-to-book ratio, the logarithm of sales as a size proxy and a profitability measure.  
They found that key factors that were related to firm leverage in the U.S. seemed similarly 
related in other countries as well.   
 Following Rajan and Zingales’ cross-country studies, Booth et al. (2001) examined 
factors that impact capital structures in developing countries.  They found that the most 
successful predictor of firms’ leverage is profitability. They conclude that firms’ capital structure 
choices in the ten developing countries they studied are affected by the same variables as in 
developed countries. 
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 These types of studies lay out the empirical foundation to investigate firms’ financing 
choices, but they focus on publicly listed firms.  Recently, using data on U.S. private firms, Cole 
(2008) tests the pecking order and trade-off theories and finds more support for the pecking order 
theory.  Within the Chinese context, the pecking order theory also appears to be the more 
appropriate framework for analyzing Chinese firms.  One reason for this proposition is that a 
very small percentage of firms in China are publically listed.  Only 1,500 or so firms are traded 
on China’s two exchanges, and by some estimates fewer than 15 percent of those are privately-
controlled (Kato and Long 2006).  Even within the group of listed Chinese firms, two studies 
argue that the trade-off theory is not relevant (Chen, 2004; Ni and Yu 2008) while one argues 
that it is (Huang and Song 2006).   Based on data for listed firms only, Ni and Yu (2008) find 
limited evidence for the pecking order theory (only in large listed firms), while Tong and Green 
(2005) find stronger evidence for it based on a database of 44 traded companies.  Although Ni 
and Yu (2008, p.110) find that the pecking order fits with large firms only, they indicate this 
result seem unusual as this theory is more suitable for small companies as they were be expected 
to function in a context with more serious asymmetric information. As we are focusing on the 
possible differentiating characteristics between private and state firms, and the fact that 
thousands of private firms are not listed, we feel the pecking order theory is the better starting 
point.  
 A second reason is that foreign firms benefit more than domestic firms from tax breaks.  
A paper by Li et al. (2009), using survey data for Chinese firms similar to ours, focused on 
comparing the capital structure of state-owned companies with that of foreign owned firms.3  
                                                          
3 They use data from 2000-2004 while ours is from 2003-2006. 
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They found that state firms were relatively highly leveraged but that firms with foreign 
ownership have relatively low leverage.  They argue that the results with respect to foreign firms 
are consistent with the trade-off theory because during the period under investigation, foreign 
firms paid lower tax rates than domestic firms.  Foreign firms also have funding options from 
outside the country in which they are located.  In this study we focus on the development of 
domestic, private firms in China as compared with state-controlled companies and their 
financing choices within China, and therefore we do not include firms with foreign ownership.  
This makes the trade-off theory less relevant. 
 For these reasons, given the nature of China’s economic transition, we believe that the 
pecking order theory is the most appropriate framework to explore how leverage is determined 
across ownership types and across regions.  The pecking order theory as well as the existing 
studies on capital structure provide several key determinants of leverage  as summarized in table 
1 (Cole, 2008, pp.10-13).  The more profitable firms are, and the more financial slack (such as 
cash reserves) firms have, the less leverage we would expect them to use since they would have 
access to more internal financing.  Expectations about good growth prospects also would lead to 
less leverage if that growth was expected to generate retainable profits. In contrast, the larger a 
firm and the more tangible assets a firm has, and firms that are in industries with higher average 
leverage ratios, the more leverage we would expect them to use.   Larger firms, and firms with 
more tangible assets, are expected to be able to borrow more easily and at lower costs than 
smaller firms because they pose lower risks to banks both in terms of providing more 
information to evaluate risk (fewer informational asymmetries between insiders and outsiders) 
and having more collateral to repay creditors should bankruptcy occur.  The average leverage 
ratio varies by industry and represents a target leverage level for firms.  Finally, firm age could 
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lead to either a positive or negative relationship.  The older the firm, the more leverage they 
would be expected to use because they would have better access to loans given they would have 
had time to establish a track record.   On the other hand, younger firms typically do not have 
much liquidity and so need to rely on bank loans more.   
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
  
 While we recognize that there are different forms of capitalist firms (Chan and Unger, 
2009), there are certain basic expectations of firm behavior in a market economy such as a need 
to make a profit to stay in business.  We expect that private firms are the most likely to meet this 
criteria in China.  However, because the Chinese approach to reforms has been to push state 
firms to function with hard budget constraints in a market economy, one outcome might be that 
by the 2000s, different ownership forms behaved in similar ways as reflected in their 
determinants of leverage.   Since these changes may be difficult to make for old style state firms, 
we also might expect that newly established state firms would behave differently than well 
established ones.  Likewise, firms that operate in an institutional environment that is more 
market-oriented are more likely to have leverage determinants similar to private firms in a 
market economy such as the U.S.  In China, the coastal areas are the most advanced 
institutionally, followed by the northeast and then the inland areas.   
 These expectations are stated as the following hypotheses, H1-H5. 
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 (H1)  If reforms have been successful at inducing market behavior, the amount of 
leverage firms of all ownership forms should exhibit leverage determinants as the 
pecking order theory predicts.  
(H2)  If H1 is rejected, and if small and large private firms have different leverage 
determinants, then large private firms in China have more similar leverage determinants 
to state firms.  
(H3) Because new firms would be less likely to have managerial history with the 
former planned system, young state firms have more similar leverage determinants to 
private firms than older state firms. 
(H4)  If reforms have been successful system-wide to establish market-oriented 
institutions, firms’ leverage determinants should be similar for firms in different 
geographical regions. 
(H5)  If H4 is rejected, then the coastal areas that received priority with reforms and 
therefore tend to be more marketized would more clearly exhibit leverage determinants as 
the pecking order theory predicts. 
 
Data and Estimation 
 To test these hypotheses we utilize industrial firm level data from the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) covering the period of 2003 to 2006.4  This data set is one of the most 
                                                          
4 This dataset is known as the “Industrial Microdata” in English.  
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comprehensive on China’s manufacturing industry. Unlike many available data sets that cover 
the approximately 1500 publicly listed firms in China, this database covers all state-owned firms 
and registered non-state-owned firms with annual sales above 500,000 Yuan.  It provides 
detailed information about each firm’s year-end financial statements and the firm’s 
characteristics, including NBS’s manufacture industry code,5 organizational form, firm age, 
number of employees, location, etc.  The appendix tables A1-A4 provide the descriptive statistics 
for our variables.    
 The organizational forms reported are: state-owned, collectively-owned, stock 
cooperative enterprises, jointly operated enterprises, limited liability companies, companies 
limited by shares, private firms of different organizational forms, and enterprises established by 
foreign investors.  For our purposes we divide the firms into three ownership categories: state-
owned enterprises (SOE), mixed state-owned and private.  The SOE category is wholly state-
owned with approximately 13,000 firms (category 110 in Tables A3-A4); the mixed category 
includes all of the hybrid state-owned firms that have issued shares or have other types of 
alliances and therefore are not considered wholly state-owned for registration purposes with 
approximately 45,000 firms (categories 120-160); and private firms with approximately 45,000 
firms (categories 171-174).6  We exclude all foreign invested firms.7  
 Several other characteristics from the appendix tables need to be highlighted.  First, 
short-term loans are much higher than long-term loans.8  Measured in terms of share of assets, 
                                                          
5 This industrial classification is similar to the standard industrial classification (SIC) used internationally. 
6 Note that the number of observations varies by year and variable. 
7 Firms included in the survey are not stable over time.  Hence in one year the set of firm IDs will not fully match 
those in another year if a firm went out of business.   For this reason, estimations that include lagged values and 
variables that measure change over time will drop some of the observations.   
8 Long-term loans are for one year or more. 
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for all of the firms in the survey for all four years, the average long-term loans to assets ratio was 
only 5 percent while for short term liabilities as a share of assets it was 51 percent.  The long-
term loan to asset ratios for private firms and mixed ownership firms are only 6 and 4 percent 
respectively, while both types’ short-term loan to asset ratios were 58 percent.  Compare this to 
small public firms in the U.S. where the long-term loan to asset ratio varied from 11 percent in 
2003 to 20 percent in 1987, while total loans to the asset ratio varied between 44 and 57 percent 
(Cole, 2008, p.20).  So while total loans to assets are comparable, in China there is apparently a 
strong bias towards short-term borrowing.9  Given the character of the loan structure in the 
Chinese case, we use the ratio of short-term liabilities to assets as our main variable of inquiry.10  
 Second, the mean profit (measured as return on assets) for wholly-owned state firms is 1 
percent, while mixed ownership and private firms have mean positive profit at 8 and 11 percent 
respectively.  SOE firms in the northeast region on average lose money and in inland areas profit 
is just barely above zero.  In this data set, half of the wholly-owned state firms reported zero or 
negative profits, while only 10 percent of the private and the mixed ownership state firms 
reported zero or negative profits.   So although progress has supposedly been made in terms of 
commercializing state companies, there apparently are many that continue to survive without 
being profitable.  The successful, so-called, “champion” national firms are more likely to fall 
into the mixed ownership category because most of them have issued shares on one of the 
exchanges, or have some foreign investment or other ownership characteristic that means they 
                                                          
9 Anecdotally, it has been reported that short-term funds are often mismatched with long-term projects. 
Communication with Standard Chartered, Shanghai, 18 May 2010.  
10 The correlation coefficient between long-term and short-term debt in our data is .9.  In addition, we ran the same 
set of regressions using total loans to asset ratio as the dependent variable.  We find the results very similar to those 
presented here. 
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are no longer wholly state-owned.   
 Finally, tangible assets as a percent of total assets are higher for SOE firms than for the 
other ownership forms.  For SOEs this percent is almost at 50 as compared with 36 percent for 
private firms.  From the regional comparison we can see that SOEs in the northeast and inland 
areas have the highest ratios of tangible assets to total assets.   
 Based on our theoretical framework and the particular characteristics of this data set, our 
estimated equation is given as equation (1).  The dependent variable to capture leverage (LVit) is 
total short-term loans as a percent of total assets for firm i in year t.  Profit is measured as the 
return on assets. The Sales variable represents financial slack or access to liquid assets, and is 
measured as sales revenue.  Size is the number of employees which measures firm size; Assets 
are tangible assets as a percent of total assets, which is our measure of firm collateral; and 
AvgLV is the industry median leverage ratio; Age is measured as the log of each firm’s age.   
These independent variables (except for size) are lagged one year, under the assumption that a 
loan decision would be made on last year’s performance rather than current performance, 
whether the bank or the firm’s management was making the decision.11   
 Equation (1) will be estimated for each ownership group and region, and by size and age, 
to test our stated hypotheses.   We define large private firms as those having assets of 20,714 
Yuan, which represents the top 25 percent of the private firms in this data set.  We define young 
firms as those that were established in 1996 or later, which is after the major company reforms 
                                                          
11 With the data set available, we do not have an independent measure for growth prospects.  Berkman et al., (2009) 
and Ni and Yu (2008) used asset growth to capture growth potential in the case of China and Cole (2008) used 
change in employment.  However, because we are using lagged variables, we are wary of adding a growth variable 
to capture potential growth for firms.  In addition, our sales revenue variable may be a proxy for growth as well as 
for available liquid assets.    
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aimed at creating incentives for market behavior were in place.  The survey defines the firms by 
three regions: (1) is the northeast and includes Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning; (2) is the coast 
and includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
Guangzhou, Hainan; and (3) is the inland areas and includes Shanxi, Neimenggu, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.   
 The estimation procedure is based on pooled time series and cross-sectional data with 
fixed effects by firms, using truncated data that dropped the outliers below 5 percent and above 
95 percent as well as those observations that were obviously wrong.12   
 
Equation (1):  
LVit  =  β1 + β2Profiti,t-1 + β3Salesi,t-1 +  + β4Assetsi,t-1 + β5Sizei,t  + β6Agei,t-1 +  
 β7AvgLVi,t-1 + μ 
Where i= firm; t = time period. 
 
Results 
 Tables 2-6 present our results.  The first set of results is for private firms.  Column (3) in 
table 2 presents the results for the full set of private firms in the survey, with large private firms 
presented in column (4) and small and medium-sized (SME) private firms presented in column 
                                                          
12 For example, if a firm reported zero assets. 
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(5).  Profit is significant and negative as expected in all three cases.  Sales revenue, our measure 
for financial slack, is also significant and negative as expected.  Firm size is significant and 
positive for the subset of SME private firms, but is insignificant for large private firms and all 
private firms.  The average leverage of each group of firms is positive and significant, as 
expected.  The age variable is negative and significant for the full sample and for SMEs, 
suggesting that smaller private firms need more leverage perhaps because they are younger.  All 
of these results are fairly consistent with the pecking order theory. 
         The one result that is inconsistent with the theory is the tangible asset variable, which was 
expected to be positive but here resulted in significant, negative coefficients in all three cases.  
The pecking order theory suggests that tangible assets signal collateral that would increase the 
chances, and/or lower the costs, of acquiring a loan.   In the case of this data set in China, 
something else seems to be going on.  Here we see the higher the ratio of tangible assets to total 
assets, the less likely a firm is to take out a loan.  Our expectations concerning tangible assets 
assume that banks in China would try to recover some losses if a loan is not repaid.  This in fact 
may not happen very often.  In addition, with the state sector, policy directives ensure bank 
support to the targeted companies to prevent bankruptcies.  Banks may then shy away even more 
than usual from loaning to the risky private sector, and/or small and medium-sized sector, to 
keep their balance sheets reasonable.  The Li et al. (2009) paper also reported this result with 
their similar survey data but did not address any reason or implications.  Interestingly, Liu et al. 
(2011) found negative coefficients for their assets variable with total leverage and short-term 
leverage, and positive coefficients with long-term leverage and bank loans as their dependent 
variables.  Chen (2004) also found the asset variable to be insignificant with her pooled 
estimation of 88 listed firms between 1995 and 2000 using total leverage as the dependent 
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variable, but to be significant and positive with long-term leverage as the dependent variable.  
Using data from 1200 Chinese listed firms, Huang and Song (2006) found a positive relationship 
between tangible assets and market-valued total liabilities in only one of their models, and the 
relationship was insignificant in their other specifications.  A key difference between their 
studies and ours is that their data included only listed firms, which are overwhelmingly state 
firms.  Hence the size of tangible assets in the private sector may be indicating a better run firm, 
or one with more resources, rather than one that could repay a loan with assets if need be.13  
Alternatively, there could be something about the nature of short-term debt in China that is 
behind these unexpected results.14     
 Overall, then, the results in table 2 suggest that private firms with more profit, higher 
sales revenue, a higher percentage of tangible assets, and those that are smaller and older, use 
less leverage.  Size and age do not explain leverage for large private firms.  Except for the 
expectations relating to tangible assets, the capital structure of this set of firms is explained well 
by the pecking order theory, especially for SME private firms.   
 Table 3 presents the results for the wholly-owned SOE firms.   Looking at column (3) we 
can see that wholly-owned state firms overall do not fit the expectations of the pecking order 
theory.  The profit variable is negative and significant and the tangible asset variable is 
significant and negative as was the case with the private firms.  The other variables are all 
insignificant.  With the profit variable, however, we need to be careful with the interpretation of 
the results in this case.  For example, it could be that firms that made less profit received more 
loans, resulting in a significant, negative coefficient on our profit variable.  That is quite different 
                                                          
13 The ratio of tangible assets variable is positively correlated with the profit variable with a coefficient of .7.   
14  Note that Tong and Green (2005) and Ni and Yu (2008) do not include tangible assets in their discussion or 
estimations.   
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than firms who make enough profit that they can self-finance, and therefore have less liability. 
The negative coefficient on profits for all of these categories of firms is quite large ranging from 
.10 to .25 as compared with the private firms whose profit coefficients were in the .03 to .05 
range.  Based on what we know about the low average profits in this sector, the negative 
coefficient may mean that even non-profitable state companies received loans.  In fact, the less 
profitable firms may be more likely to receive loans if government policy uses state companies 
to ensure employment or other outcomes, and is willing to pay for this through guaranteed loans 
from the state banking system.   The tangible asset variable is also significant and negative for all 
SOEs except the young firms as was the case with the private firms, although again—and maybe 
especially in this case—it does not seem likely that tangible assets are signaling available backup 
collateral in case of firm failure.  Finally, the results for young wholly-owned firms (column 4) 
show that profits and size were significant but nothing else.   In other words, in contrast to our 
expectations, young, wholly-owned state firms do not seem to have similar factors determining 
their capital structure as private firms.     
            The results for the mixed ownership firms (columns 5 and 6) are not much different than 
for the wholly-owned state firms.  Profits, tangible assets and the mean industry average are 
significant for all mixed ownership firms and for the young mixed ownership firms, whereas age, 
size and sales revenue did not matter.    Bai et al. (2009) reported that firms with some move 
towards partial privatization seemed to have incentives to behave more like private companies 
with hard budget constraints.   Our results do not strongly support this. Huang and Song (2006) 
also conclude from their study of listed firms in the 2000s in China that listed state firms do seem 
to be profit-maximizers, but again, most of our state firms are not listed and do not seem to be 
profitable overall.    
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 Relating these results to our set of hypotheses, we do not find support for H1-H3.  Firms 
of different ownership forms have different leverage determinants with little evidence that state 
firms behave similarly to private ones in terms of capital structure.  Even the results for the 
young state firms were more similar to the wholly-owned state firms than to the private firms, as 
were the mixed ownership firms.      
    
(Insert Tables 2-3 here) 
 
 Tables 4-6 present our results for the regional analysis which reflects institutional 
development.  Looking first at private firms in table 4, column (3) presents the results for the 
coastal area, the most marketized area of China.  All the variables except for firm size are 
significant and consistent with our expectations overall.  Except for the sign of the tangible assets 
coefficient as was the case in the first set of results, this set of results fits the pecking order 
theory very well.   Comparing the coastal region with the northeast sample, the size of firms 
becomes significant and the age of the firms became insignificant (column 4).  For firms in the 
inland areas, profits, tangible assets and the mean industry average were significant, with size, 
sales and age being insignificant (column 5).  These results provide some evidence that the less 
developed the region, the less the pecking order theory can explain the loan structure of private 
firms.     
 Results for wholly-owned state firms are reported in Table 5.  Profit is the only 
significant variable across all three regions.  In the inland area, it is the only significant variable 
and most likely represents policy lending, as these firms are mostly unprofitable.  The 
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coefficients are very large, and again most likely reflect governments’ desire to keep these 
companies operating.  For state firms in inland areas, the only significant variable is the return on 
assets.  For the northeast, firm age and assets also matter. 
 Finally, table 6 presents the results for the mixed ownership firms.  The results for the 
coastal and inland areas are similar, with profits, assets and the industry median being 
significant.  Again, the capital structure of mixed ownership firms is explained partially by the 
theory, but not as well as the private sector.  In the case of the northeast, however, the F statistic 
is not significant, indicating there is a very poor fit indeed.   
 The main finding from the regional estimations is that leverage ratios are determined 
differently across regions for all ownership types, which leads us to reject H4.   The northeast 
region (which includes three provinces, Heilongjiang, Liaoning and Jilin) fits the theoretical 
expectation the least well, while the coastal results are the best.  The coastal results for private 
firms fit the theory very well, as suggested by H5.  The Li et al. (2009) study also found that 
firms in coastal areas had less leverage. However, this result was contrary to their expectations 
because they did not apply the pecking order theory. 
 
 
(Insert Tables 4-6 here) 
 
Discussion & Conclusion  
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 Overall our results show that different ownership types and firms located in different 
regions do not have the same determinants of leverage.  The pecking order theory explains 
private firms’ leverage determinants the best, especially for the SMEs, as compared with other 
ownership forms, and regionally, the fit is best in the more marketized coast.  Our results reject 
H1-H4 since there were clear differences in the determinants of leverage between ownership 
types, age of firms and across regions, and that large private firms did not behave in similar ways 
as state-owned firms.   
 Other studies on China’s banking sector have suggested that lending has increasingly 
been tied to expectations about good performance as banks may be subject to increasing costs 
associated with non-performing loans and bankrupt firms.  For example, Firth et al. (2009) find 
that more profitable firms have higher loan ratios using 2002 firm survey data and Yeung (2009) 
finds via interviews that bank management is increasingly sensitive to risk and therefore wary of 
making loans without good information.  Our results suggest something different is going on, at 
least for the manufacturing sector.  In all of our estimates the profit variable was negative and 
significant, suggesting that the more profitable a firm, the lower their loan to asset ratio.  So 
while state firms may be more likely to have loans than other ownership forms as reported by Li 
et al. (2009), our results suggest that the more profitable firms of all ownership types have lower 
loan ratios.  If a firm can avoid taking a loan from a bank, they seem to prefer to self-finance or 
use other forms of financing.  Based on her study of listed firms, Chen (2004) interprets this 
situation as firms having a different pecking order, if allowed.  That is, they would prefer to self-
finance first, but then would prefer equity financing over bank loans.  Her reasoning is based on 
the fact that both the companies she is studying and the banks lending to them are state-owned, 
hence equity financing is low cost and relatively unconstrained since the only shareholder that 
19 
 
matters is the government.  Ni and Yu (2008, p.111) also point out that equity financing is 
preferable for listed firms since there are high costs to entering the corporate bond market and 
the inefficient banking system may be a deterrent to borrowing.  In our study most of the firms, 
regardless of ownership, do not have the equity option, and if they did, the preference might vary 
depending on ownership form.  In any case, the fact that there are more firms that would like to 
list compared with the number allowed raises the value of listing, as does the high value given to 
the non-tradable shares of listed companies (Huang & Song 2006, pp.25, 27). 
 Our results raise a puzzle related to tangible assets.  In general it is thought that firms 
with a higher ratio of tangible assets to total assets are more likely to receive bank loans because 
they will have more tangible assets to put up as collateral.  However, we find a fairly consistent, 
significantly negative relationship between the tangible asset ratio and the loan ratio.   So again, 
firms that might be expected to more easily qualify for bank loans do not use them in the case of 
manufacturing firms in China in the 2000s.   
 The story behind these results is no doubt quite complex, and the analysis is complicated 
by missing variables.  For example, it may be that banks prefer to loan to the better governed 
firms as suggested by Firth et al. (2009), but these firms may also be the more profitable ones.  
With the data that we have, we are not able to sort out these possible effects.   Nonetheless, the 
overall results of our study suggest that private firms in China are making leverage decisions as 
would be expected of firms in a market business environment as described by the pecking order 
theory.  State-owned firms, and even firms of mixed ownership, reveal a different story.  These 
results are consistent with results on listed firms, as reported in Liu et al. (2011), which are 
largely state-controlled.  The determinants of leverage for the state firms may be better 
understood with policy and political variables rather than what we expect from market-oriented, 
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profit maximizing firms with hard budget constraints.   
 Further limitations with respect to this study include the time frame covered and the 
available variables.  This survey data set ends in 2006 just as a new round of financial sector 
reforms was launched that included building bond markets in China (Walter and Howie 2011).  
However, the response to the financial crisis in 2009 apparently reversed much of the progress 
that was initiated.  In any case, the short time span, 2003-06, of the survey available to us cannot 
capture the rapidly changing financial environment in China.  Limitations on the variables also 
make it difficult to explore key questions such as the reasons for the very large importance of 
short-term relative to long-term debt in the Chinese context, the role of tangible assets in firms’ 
decision-making, and how the lack of development of a bond market affects firms’ behavior.  
These are all areas for future research.   
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Appendix: Table A1: Descriptive Statistics – Variable Means,  2003-2006 
Variable Wholly 
SOEs 
Mixed 
SOEs 
Private 
Only 
All 
Firms 
Regional Comparison 
    Wholly SOEs only Mixed SOEs Private 
1 NE 2 Coast 3 Inland 1 NE 2 Coast 3 Inland 1 NE 2 Coast 3 Inland 
Long-term 
loans to total 
assets 
.15 .06 0.04 .05 .14 .12 .17 .06 .05 .09 .04 .03 .06 
Short-term 
Loans to total 
assets 
.46 .51 .53 .51 .48 .47 .45 .52 .53 .48 .50 .55 .45 
Total loans to 
total assets 
.62 .58 .58 .56 .63 .6 .64 .58 .58 .58 .55 .59 .53 
Sales 
(1,000,000 
Yuan) 
174.8 133.79 38.71 97.66 195 197 155 213 131 124 34.42 392.29 38.05 
Employees 
(number) 
598.06 424.88 169.8 327.14 932.17 460.7 639.71 568.03 355.79 519.73 150 164.54 191.67 
Firm Age 
(Years) 
27.34 11.47 6.4 9.32 27 27.81 27.06 11.05 11.41 11.69 6.53 6.44 6.41 
Firm Age (log) 3.04 2.03 1.56 1.83 2.99 3.0 3.03 1.95 2.08 1.97 1.51 1.57 1.51 
Profitability 
(ROA) 
.01 .08 .11 .08  -.003 0.01 .006 .02 .09 .08 .08 0.11 0.11 
Tangible 
Assets (% of 
total assets) 
.48 .35 0.36 0.36 0.49 0.43 .52 .37 .32 .40 0.41 0.34 0.41 
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Industry 
Median 
leverage 
.04 .005 .00 .004 .03 .03 .04 .004 .003 .008 .00 .00 .001 
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Appendix: Table A2: Descriptive Statistics – Variable Medians, 2003-2006 
 
Variables 
  
  
Wholly 
SOEs 
Mixed 
SOEs 
Private All Firms 
Regional Comparison 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wholly SOEs Only 
 
Mixed SOEs 
 
Private 
1 NE 2 Coast 3 Inland 1 NE  2 Coast 3 Inland 1 NE 2 Coast 3 Inland 
Long-term 
Loans to total 
assets .03 0 0 0 0 0.008 0.07 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0 
Short-term 
Loans to total 
assets .45 .51 .55 .51 .48 .46 .44 .52 .54 .47 .50 .58 .44 
Total loans to 
total assets .63 .6 .6 .59 .64 .6 .64 .6 .6 .59 .56 .62 .53 
Sales 
(1,000,000 
yuan) 11.09 22.07 16.4 20.1 10.9 12.1 12.4 18.6 22.15 22.76 14 16.47 16.8 
Employees 
(number) 167 140 97 142 173 145 181 137 170 126 82 94 110 
Firm Age 
(years) 26 8 6.43 6 23.5 25 27 7 8 7 4 5 4 
Firm Age (log) 3.26 2.08 1.61 1.79 3.18 3.22 3.3 1.95 2.07 1.95 1.61 1.61 1.61 
Profitability 
(ROA) .001 0.03 0.04 0.03 0 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 
Tangible  
Assets  (% of 
total assets) .48 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.41 0.53 0.34 0.29 0.38 0.39 0.31 0.40 
Industry 
Median 
leverage 0 0 0  0  0  .0  .0  0 0 0 0  0  0  
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Appendix: Table A3: Descriptive Statistics – Mean Ratios of Total Loans to Total Assets by Ownership 
 
Register 
type code Organizational Form 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean  
                 
110  Whole Stated Owned  13,979 0.63 14,701 0.63 13,144 0.62 10,922 0.61 
120  Collectively-owned  12,867 0.58 14,128 0.58 13,576 0.55 10,615 0.55 
130 
stock cooperative 
enterprises 6,724 0.60 6,863 0.60 6,767 0.58 5,209 0.57 
140 
 jointly operated 
enterprises 1,120 0.56 1,138 0.56 1,039 0.55 838 0.56 
150 
 limited liability 
companies 19,725 0.60 34,372 0.60 37,610 0.58 35,638 0.58 
160 
 companies limited by 
shares 4,611 0.57 5,996 0.56 6,383 0.56 5,572 0.55 
171 
 Private firm - a sole 
proprietorship 11,926 0.56 20,116 0.56 23,936 0.53 22,061 0.53 
172 
 private cooperative 
enterprises 2,565 0.53 4,583 0.53 5,248 0.50 4,734 0.51 
173 &174 
 private limited liability 
companies & private 
companies limited by 
shares 30,730 0.59 71,269 0.60 80,808 0.58 78,481 0.58 
190 
 other domestic 
enterprises 253 0.54 262 0.58 862 0.54 582 0.56 
                           All firms 135,362 0.57 221,818 0.58 240,569 0.56 223,104 0.56 
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Appendix: Table A4: Descriptive Statistics – Median Ratios of Total Loans to Total Assets by Ownership 
 
Register 
type code Organizational Form 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
Obs Median Obs Median Obs Median Obs Median  
                 
110  Whole Stated Owned  13,979 0.63 14,701 0.63 13,144 0.62 10,922 0.61 
120  Collectively-owned  12,867 0.59 14,128 0.59 13,576 0.56 10,615 0.56 
130 
stock cooperative 
enterprises 6,724 0.62 6,863 0.62 6,767 0.59 5,209 0.58 
140 
 jointly operated 
enterprises 1,120 0.58 1,138 0.58 1,039 0.56 838 0.58 
150 
 limited liability 
companies 19,725 0.62 34,372 0.62 37,610 0.60 35,638 0.60 
160 
 companies limited by 
shares 4,611 0.59 5,996 0.58 6,383 0.57 5,572 0.56 
171 
 Private firm - a sole 
proprietorship 11926 0.58 20,116 0.58 23,936 0.53 22,061 0.53 
172 
 private cooperative 
enterprises 2,565 0.54 4,583 0.54 5,248 0.49 4,734 0.51 
173 &174 
 private limited liability 
companies & private 
companies limited by 
shares 30,730 0.62 71,269 0.63 80,808 0.61 78,481 0.61 
190 
 other domestic 
enterprises 253 0.57 262 0.62 862 0.54 582 0.56 
                           All firms 135,362 0.59 221,818 0.59 240,569 0.57 223,104 0.57 
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Table 1: Standard variables in the pecking order theory with expected signs 
 
Dependent variable: leverage = total loans/total assets 
Variable Expected sign 
Profit - 
Financial slack/liquid assets - 
Growth prospects - 
Firm size + 
Firm assets + 
Industry leverage average  + 
Firm age +/- 
Source: Based on Cole (2008). 
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Table 2: Estimation Results, Private Firms 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Short-term Loans to Total Assets, 2003-2006 
(1) 
Regressors 
(symbol) 
(2) 
Variable 
(3) 
Private  
Firms,  
All 
(4) 
Private 
Firms, 
Large 
(5) 
Private 
Firms, 
SME 
Profitit Return on Assets 
(lagged)   
-.046*** 
(.0048) 
-.025*** 
(.008) 
-.039*** 
(.0070) 
Salesit Sales revenue 
(lagged) 
-2.95e-08** 
(1.25e-08) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
-2.08e-08* 
(1.16e-08) 
-5.32e-07*** 
(1.02e-07) 
Sizeit Number of 
employees 
.00001 
(6.20e-06) 
1.71e-06 
(6.49e-06) 
.00003*** 
(.00001) 
Assetsit Ratio of tangible 
assets to total 
assets (lagged) 
-.0455*** 
(.007) 
-.052*** 
(.0128) 
-.0323*** 
(.009) 
AveLVit Median loans to 
total assets  
(lagged) 
.1***
(.02)
.084** 
(.036) 
.06** 
(.0269) 
Ageit Log of firm age 
(lagged) 
-.008*** 
(.0017) 
-.0036 
(.0029) 
-.007*** 
(.002) 
Constant  .507*** 
(.013) 
.52*** 
(.023) 
.53*** 
(.0170) 
     
# Obs.   128,782 38,030 90,752 
# of firms  102,035 30,445 75,194 
Adj. R-
square 
 .123 .1 .087 
F-stat   34.82*** 6.48*** 25.6*** 
     
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * denotes 10% significance level, ** 5% 
significance level, *** 1% significance levels; large private firms are defined as those with assets 
valued at 20,714 Yuan or more. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results, State-Owned Enterprises 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Short-term Loans to Total Assets, 2003-2006 
(1) 
Regressors 
(symbol) 
(2) 
Variable 
(3) 
SOE 
Wholly-
owned 
 
(4) 
SOE  
Wholly-
owned 
Young, 
 
(5) 
SOE  
Mixed, 
 
(6) 
SOE 
Mixed 
Young 
 
Profitit Return on 
Assets 
(lagged)   
-.159*** 
(.0184) 
-.252*** 
(.07) 
-.101*** 
(.0078) 
-.132*** 
(.012) 
Salesit Sales 
revenue 
(lagged) 
3.27e-09 
(2.53e-09) 
-8.95e-09 
(1.52-08) 
2.72e-10 
(1.34e-09) 
1.77e-09 
(2.99e-
09) 
Sizeit Number of 
employees 
1.78e-06 
(1.63e-06) 
.00003*** 
(.00001) 
-5.70e-07 
(1.16e-06) 
1.09e-06 
(2.15e-
06) 
Assetsit Ratio of 
tangible 
assets to 
total assets 
(lagged) 
-.047*** 
(.013) 
-.003 
(.077) 
-.032*** 
(.0079) 
-.043*** 
(.012) 
AveLVit Median 
loans to 
total assets  
(lagged) 
.013 
(.022) 
-.033 
(.077) 
.09*** 
(.022) 
.08** 
(.033) 
Ageit Log of firm 
age (lagged) 
-.003 
(.0043) 
-.01 
(.0082) 
-.0007 
(.0017) 
.0017 
(.002) 
Constant  .48*** 
(.021) 
.497*** 
(.056) 
.48*** 
(.0141) 
.48*** 
(.02) 
      
# Obs.   21,788 2863 84,054 45,116 
# of firms  14,568 2227 61,491 35,424 
Adj. R-
square 
 .08 .001 .068 .06 
F-stat   14.45*** 3.25*** 35.59*** 23.62*** 
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Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * denotes 10% significance level, ** 5% 
significance level, *** 1% significance levels. 
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Table 4: Estimation Results, Private Firms by Region 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Short-term Loans to Total Assets, 2003-2006 
(1) 
Regressors 
(symbol) 
(2) 
Variable 
(3) 
Private  
Firms,  
Coast 
(4) 
Private 
Firms, 
Northeast 
(5) 
Private 
Firms, 
Inland 
Profitit Return on 
Assets (lagged)   
-.0417*** 
(.0051) 
-.199*** 
(.048) 
-.058*** 
(.0128) 
Salesit Sales revenue 
(lagged) 
-2.43e-08* 
(1.29e-08) 
-2.71e-
07*** 
(1.01e-07) 
-2.54e-08 
(4.60e-08) 
Sizeit Number of 
employees 
.0000 
(7.07e-06) 
.0001** 
(.00004) 
2.25e-06 
(.0000) 
Assetsit Ratio of 
tangible assets 
to total assets 
(lagged) 
-.0312*** 
(.008) 
-.0879** 
(.035) 
-.08*** 
(.0163) 
AveLVit Median loans 
to total assets  
(lagged) 
.08*** 
(.0231) 
.18* 
(.1096) 
.147*** 
(.051) 
Ageit Log of firm 
age (lagged) 
-.0087*** 
(.0019) 
-.001 
(.0082) 
-.004 
(.0037) 
Constant  .5379*** 
(.0149) 
.44*** 
(.067) 
.42*** 
(.0308) 
     
# Obs.   94,964 6,509 27,283 
# of firms  74,360 5,333 22,327 
Adj. R-
square 
 .102 .07 .124 
F-stat   22.66*** 7.45***  10.22*** 
     
 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * denotes 10% significance level, ** 5% 
significance level, *** 1% significance levels. 
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Table 5: Estimation Results, State-Owned Firms by Region 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Short-term Loans to Total Assets, 2003-2006 
(1) 
Regressors 
(symbol) 
(2) 
Variable 
(3) 
SOE  
Wholly-
owned,  
Coast 
(4) 
SOE 
Wholly-
owned, 
Northeast 
(5) 
SOE 
Wholly-
owned, 
Inland 
Profitit Return on 
Assets (lagged)   
-.237*** 
(.0278) 
-.16** 
(.07) 
-.103*** 
(.0260) 
Salesit Sales revenue 
(lagged) 
6.19e-09 
(3.96e-09) 
-1.39e-09 
(4.66e-09) 
3.38e-09 
(4.44e-09) 
Sizeit Number of 
employees 
-9.48e-08 
(4.52e-06) 
1.84e-06 
(2.04e-06) 
1.77e-06 
(3.17e-06) 
Assetsit Ratio of 
tangible assets 
to total assets 
(lagged) 
-.06*** 
(.020) 
-.13*** 
(.0447) 
-.027 
(.0180) 
AveLVit Median loans 
to total assets  
(lagged) 
-.0145 
(.029) 
.067 
(.08) 
.04 
(.035) 
Ageit Log of firm 
age (lagged) 
.007 
(.007) 
-.03** 
(.014) 
-.0044 
(.0058) 
Constant  .48*** 
(.03) 
.59*** 
(.07) 
.45*** 
(.0309) 
     
# Obs.   8,536 2,086 11,158 
# of firms  5,648 1,476 7,447 
Adj. R-
square 
 .042 .1467 .09 
F-stat   14.09*** 3.15*** 3.42*** 
     
 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * denotes 10% significance level, ** 5% 
significance level, *** 1% significance levels. 
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Table 6: Estimation Results, Mixed Ownership SOE Firms by Region 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Short-term Loans to Total Assets, 2003-2006 
(1) 
Regressors 
(symbol) 
(2) 
Variable 
(3) 
SOE  
Mixed,  
Coast 
(4) 
SOE 
Mixed, 
Northeast 
(5) 
SOE 
Mixed, 
Inland 
Profitit Return on 
Assets (lagged)   
-.086*** 
(.0089) 
-.108** 
(.0437) 
-.14*** 
(.0162) 
Salesit Sales revenue 
(lagged) 
1.33e-09 
(1.68e-09) 
-8.99e-10 
(2.87e-09) 
-3.54e-09 
(4.00e-09) 
Sizeit Number of 
employees 
5.02e-07 
(1.47e-06) 
-2.77e-06 
(4.29e-06) 
-2.5e-06 
(2.19e-06) 
Assetsit Ratio of 
tangible assets 
to total assets 
(lagged) 
-.02* 
(.0105) 
-.0200 
(.0315) 
-.051*** 
(.0133) 
AveLVit Median loans 
to total assets  
(lagged) 
.07*** 
(.027) 
.13 
(.095) 
.099** 
(.0395) 
Ageit Log of firm 
age (lagged) 
-.0020 
(.0022) 
-.0008 
(.0063) 
.0005 
(.0026) 
Constant  .49*** 
(.0178) 
.45*** 
(.06) 
.45*** 
(.025) 
     
# Obs.   50,265 5,797 27,949 
# of firms  36,409 4,317 20,751 
Adj. R-
square 
 .05 .06 .07 
F-stat   18.32*** 1.47 18.13*** 
     
 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * denotes 10% significance level, ** 5% 
significance level, *** 1% significance levels.  
